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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

This appeal was initiated by the Respondent/Appellant Ballard Smith ("Ballard") from the
Opinion on Appeal entered on January 25, 2019, issued by the Honorable Gerald F. Schroeder,
District Judge, affirming the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on January 29,
2018: the Judgment entered March 23, 2018; the Order Re: Receiver Duties entered on March
23, 2018; the Order Granting Motion to Enforce Judgment entered on May 21, 2018; and the
Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs entered on July 16, 2018, all of which were issued by the
Honorable Joanne M. Kibodeaux, Magistrate Judge. The nature of Ballard's appeal is a postdivorce modification and enforcement of property division under Idaho Rule of Family Law
Procedure 809.
B. Procedural History

This case involves an extensive procedural history that spans a period of litigation of
approximately six (6) years. The parties were in continuous litigation throughout the duration of
this case. Therefore, the procedural history is long, and the pleadings, hearings, and orders are
numerous.

In light of the circumstances, the procedural history contained herein does not

include every single event and pleading but rather sets forth the pertinent series of events that
transpired during the litigation below.
The Petitioner/Respondent Charlie Smith ("Charlie") and Ballard were divorced from one
another on April 14, 2003 . 1 The Final Order addressing the division of the assets and liabilities
was entered June 28, 2005. 2

1

R., p. 99.
R., p. 139.
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On May 14, 2007, the Honorable David E. Day entered an Order Re: April 20, 2007
Hearing ("2007 Order") that addressed and allocated an asset that had been omitted from the
Final Order which was the parties' ownership interest in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. 3
Ballard stipulated to the entry of the 2007 Order. 4 Neither party appealed the 2007 Order.
On October 23, 2008, another order was entered, the Order Dismissing Contempts and
Modifying Order Re: April 20, 2007 Hearing ("2008 Order"), by the Honorable Michael J.
Reardon. 5 The 2008 Order modified some of the provisions contained in the 2007 Order. 6 The
2008 Order was stipulated to by the parties, and neither party appealed. 7
Ballard did not comply with the court orders cited above, which led Charlie to file a
Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 on September 16, 2013. 8
The first day of trial was held on June 1, 2015, but the matter was not completed. Ballard
represented himself pro se during the first day of trial. 9

On July 13, 2015, a Notice of

Appearance was filed by attorney Derek Pica as counsel for Ballard. 10
On January 5, 2017, Charlie filed a Motion to Appoint a Receiver and a Motion for Leave
to File a Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809. 11 The court granted
leave to file the Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809. 12 The court
denied the request to have a receiver appointed. 13

:; R., p. 215, ~[ 2.
1
R., p. 215.
' R., p. 220.
R., p. 220.

,1 3.
, R .. p. 220.
8
IC p. 230.
l) Tr., p. 1-165.
10
R., p. 50. As reflected in a number of trial exhibits, Mr. Pica also represented Ballard during the course of the
post-divorce litigation and during the time period the 2007 Order and 2008 Order were entered.
I I R., pp. 507-513.
12
R., p. 521.
13
R., p. 519.
h
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Trial was held on April 24, 27 and 28, 2017. On May 4, 2017, the magistrate court
entered an Order re: Stay on Sale that prohibited the parties from listing, selling or disposing of
the real property at issue while the matter was under advisement. 14
On January 29, 2018, the court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 15
On February 26, 2018, Charlie filed Petitioner's Selection of Receivers. 16

Ballard

untimely filed Respondent's Election of Receivers on March 9, 2018. 17
On March 13, 2018, Ballard filed an Amended Objection to Proposed Judgment and
Objection to Proposed Order Appointing Receiver, wherein he objected to the judgment and
order that had been submitted by Charlie. 18
On March 23, 2018 the court entered both the Judgment and the Order re: Receiver
Duties. 19
On March 30, 2018, Ballard filed a Notice of Appeal. 20
On April 5, 2018, Charlie filed three memoranda of costs and attorney fees and a
declaration in support of a request for fees and costs. 21
On June 26, 2018, the magistrate court entered an Order Approving Receiver. 22
An Order re Petitioner's Attorney Fees and Costs was entered on July 5, 2018, wherein
the magistrate court issued a decision on the attorney fees after the parties stipulated to waive

HR.,
15
R.,
lh R.,
17
R.,
18
R.,
19
R.,
20
R.,
21
22

p.
p.
p.
p.
p.

526.
291.
536.
63.
539.
p. 316; R., p. 583.
p. 322.
R., p. 64.

R., p., 604.
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oral argument. 23 On that same date, the magistrate court also issued Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 808. 24
On July 16, 2018, the magistrate court entered a Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs
awarding Charlie $282,375.43 in attorney fees and costs. 25
On July 18, 2018, Ballard filed a Second Amended Notice of Appeal 26 to the district
court. The district court entered its Opinion on Appeal on January 25, 2019. 27
Ballard filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court on March 5, 2019. 28 The district court
issued a Judgment for Attorney Fees consistent with the Opinion on Appeal on March 18,
2019. 29
C. Statement of Facts

Ballard and Charlie were divorced from one another on April 14, 2003 ;30 however, the
Final Order addressing the division of the assets and liabilities was not entered until June 28,
2005. 31

Included in the Final Order was a property and debt schedule that identified real

property at line item 5 as "Salt Lake City Prope1iy. ,,32

As set forth on the Property Debt

Schedule, the parties stipulated that the asset was community property and allocated it with an
"X'' in husband's and wife's columns. 33 The "Remarks" column reflects that "48 acres owned

23

R., p. 67.
R., p. 332.
25
R., p. 334.
26
R., p. 336.
27
R., p. 391.
28
IC p. 69.
"J R., p. 437.
0
~ IL p. 99.
31
R., p. 139.
,:, Id.
n Id.
24
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by BC Realty//Sell." 34 Subsequently, it was discovered that the Salt Lake City property was not
held by B&C Realty, LLC, but was in fact held by Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. 35
The "Salt Lake City Property" was also explicitly addressed in the body of the Final
Order at page 3 at Paragraph E and it specifically provides:
With regard to Item 5, this property shall be sold as soon as reasonably possible.
The Court shall reserve jurisdiction over the terms and conditions of sale if the
parties are unable to reach an agreement. Until sale, each party shall pay when
due, one half of the real property taxes on said property. Upon sale, each party
shall receive one-half of the net proceeds from the sale. 36
The parties entered into a stipulation and agreed that Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc.
("SMB") was an omitted asset. 37 On May 14, 2007, the Honorable David E. Day entered an
Order Re: April 20, 2007 Hearing ("2007 Order") that provided in part:
SUN MOUNTAIN BROADCASTING, INC.: The parties stipulate and agree
that Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc., is an omitted asset which was not divided
pursuant to this Court's June 28, 2005 Final Order. With respect to this omitted
asset the parties agree that it should be equally divided. Further, the parties
stipulate and agree as follows:
a.
Ballard Smith shall cause the "Salt Lake" real property, currently deeded
in the name of "Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc.," to be transferred to B & C
Realty, LLC. 38
Ballard stipulated to the entry of the 2007 Order. Neither party appealed the 2007 Order.
The property "deeded in the name of 'Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc."' was defined by
a legal description attached to the referenced deed, and that legal description described 54 acres.
The language cited above provides that the property deeded to Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc.

34

Id.

15

R., p. 215.

1c,

Id.

18

Id.
Id. ( emphasis added).
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would be divided equally between the parties. 39 The property was an undivided legal parcel and
consisted of approximately 54 acres, not 48 acres. 40 In order to facilitate the sale of the SMB
Property, the 2007 Order instructed Ballard to transfer the real property "currently deeded in the
name of 'Sun Mountain Broadcasting"' to B&C Realty, LLC ("B&C"), a community-owned
limited liability company that was formed on December 27, 1995, to hold title to community real
property. 41 The Order did not state that only a portion of the property was to be transferred to
B&C.

Ballard violated the 2007 Order in several respects. He did not transfer all of the SMB
property to B&C. Instead, he only transferred a portion (approximately 48 acres) of the 54 acres
comprising the SMB property. Nowhere in the 2007 Order does it provide that Ballard is only to
transfer 48 acres, nor did it identify any number of acres, rather it ordered that the real property
"deeded in the name of' Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc.'" was to be transferred.
On January 23, 2008, approximately eight months after the 2007 Order was entered,
Ballard executed a Warranty Deed as the President of SMB ("B&C Deed") and transferred only
a portion of the Salt Lake City property to B&C, omitting approximately 6 acres of the property
which was deeded in the name of SMB ("Omitted Portion"). 42 The Warranty Deed for the partial
portion of the Salt Lake property was recorded on May 16, 2008, five months later.
unknown why Ballard waited five months to record the deed.

It is

Ballard failed to disclose to

Id.
Trial Exhibits 20, 22, and 23.
41
R., p. 215.
,i:i Trial Exhibits 21, 22, and 23.
Additionally, see Exhibit 221, Bate Stamp PETO 1993, which is the Metro Title
Fundamental Terms of Offer to Purchase that references the 6.644+/- acres "which is part of a 53.13 acre parcel."
Also, Bate Stamp PETO l that reflects the acreage as 53. 1 acres.
39

40
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Charlie that he had only transferred a portion of the real property. Ballard graduated from law
school and has practiced law for a number of years. 43 He was quite aware of what he was doing.
During the course of the litigation, it was discovered that after failing to transfer the
Omitted Portion to B&C, Ballard unilaterally partitioned off the Omitted Portion from the rest of
the property and sold it without Charlie's knowledge or consent to an adjoining neighbor, BZW
Investments, L.P., a Utah Limited Partnership. 44 Charlie was not paid any of the proceeds. 45
Ballard testified that he did not believe that the Omitted Portion that he sold was included in the
2007 Order. 46 This testimony directly contradicts that 2007 Order and the evidence at trial.
For example, Trial Exhibit 57 is a letter dated October 4, 2007 addressing the drafting of
the deed to B&C. 47 In this letter, Ballard's counsel suggested that since the six acres were
allegedly contaminated, that portion might be better kept out of the transfer. In this letter, Mr.
Pica noted, "Apparently, the attorney has advised Ballard that it might be more beneficial to the
parties to only deed the uncontaminated portion of the property into B&C Realty, LLC." 48 In a
subsequent letter from Derek Pica to Stan Welsh marked as Exhibit 58 and dated October 10,
2007, the following statement is made:
Ballard, based on the advice of Mr. Moore, believes that it is in the
parties' best interest that only the non-contaminated portion of the
property should be transferred to B&C Realty, LLC and that the
contaminated property should be remained titled as is.
Again, the current order requires that Ballard cause the
conveyance of the entire interest of Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. into B&C Realty, LLC, however, as stated in

13
·

Tr., p. 543, L. 3-5.
Tr., p. 72, L. 10-12; p. 333, L. 23-25.
45
Tr., p. 334, L. 3-5.
16
" Tr., p. 64-69.
47
Trial Exhibit 57.
118
Trial Exhibit 57.
44
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my previous letter, that action may not be in either of our client's
best interest given the contamination issue. 49
Charlie never expressed concern over possible contamination and never consented to the
six acres being carved out of the transfer.

The evidence also showed that Ballard himself

acknowledged that the entire 54 acre parcel was to be transferred to B&C. In a letter dated
January 26, 2010 to Stuart Stanek, General Manager of Clear Channel Radio 50 , Ballard stated
that there were radials located on what was essentially the Omitted Portion and such "property is
also owned by B&C Realty LLC."

51

Moreover, Ballard discussed the contaminated portion during the stipulation placed on
the record, and it is clear that the small contaminated portion was included.

Ballard stated,

··Your Honor, we had owned some radio stations in Salt Lake. At the time the radio stations
were sold, there was a piece of property that had two AM towers on it. There was also, about
five acres of that property that had contamination on it." 52 He continued by stating, "My way of
thinking is that it may not be that easy to sell the property but it may be --- what may be able to
happen is to sell part of it that's not near the contamination - to a developer." 53
The 2007 Order and the stipulation placed on the record are clear. The deed to Sun
Mountain Broadcasting is clear.

Ballard's written correspondence at the time the order was

entered acknowledging that the six acres were part of the 54 acres is clear. What is also clear is
that Ballard has substantially changed his position when he later argued to the magistrate court at
trial that the Omitted Portion was never to be included in the transfer to B&C. Not only is his

1
• '>

Trial Exhibit 58 (emphasis added).

,o Clear Channel Radio, later iHeart Media, leases the radio towers located on the Salt Lake Prope1iy.
Trial Exhibit 189.
R., p. 491 at Tr., p. 14, L. I 0-14. It should be noted that the transcript refers to December 6, 2007 as the date of
the hearing, but is incorrect and rather, that is the date it was filed with the court.
5
~ R., p. 492 at Tr., p. 15, L. 1-5.
1

'

52
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position not credible, but it is also frivolous, deceitful, and has cost Charlie Smith substantial
costs and fees to defend.
1. Ballard's Unilateral Transfers in Violation of the Court Orders.

Ballard was ordered to make one simple transfer of the SMB property to B&C. B&C
was the only permitted court-ordered transferee because it was the community entity in which
both Charlie and Ballard were Members with equal interests. Ballard not only violated the 2007
Order with respect to carving out the Omitted Portion for his own purposes; he further violated
the 2007 Order by transferring the Salt Lake Property to other entities in which Charlie was not a
member.
Ballard· s series of egregious violations commenced on January 23, 2008 when Ballard
executed the first B&C Deed wherein SMB transferred only approximately 48 of the 54 acres of
the Salt Lake Property to B&C, reserving the 6 acre Omitted Portion for himself down the road. 54
Although this deed was to the proper transferee (B&C), it did not include all of the property that
was ordered to be transferred.
Then Ballard subsequently executed a second deed on behalf of SMB as the Grantor, this
time for the entire 54 acres owned by SMB. This deed was to S&R Realty, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company, and was dated May 19, 2011 and recorded on June 22, 2011 ("S & R
Deed"). 55 This deed was outside the chain of title, since Ballard already had executed, on behalf
of SMB, the prior B&C Deed, covering much of the same property. Fmihermore, this deed was
made out to S&R Realty, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, which was formerly B&C

54
55

Trial Exhibit 21.
Trial Exhibit 24.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF P -13SWW/mew 16328-009/I 89230 I

1/28/20 2:06:53 PM

Realty, LLC. Ballard had no authority to change the name of B&C to S&R Realty, LLC. S&R
stands for Smith and Ryan, "Ryan" is the last name of Ballard's wife, Loree Ryan.
Apparently, in an attempt to address this clear chain of title issue created by the second
deed, Ballard on the face of this deed purported to be replacing the first B&C Deed in order to
correct a legal description. This deed states on its face that, "The legal description contained in
the Prior Deed was not the correct description that Grantor and Grantee intended to be conveyed
by the Prior Deed. " 56 It turned out that this deed was not innocently correcting a prior "mistake"
of failing to initially include the Omitted Portion in the first B&C Deed - it was an essential
correction that had to be made in order for Ballard to later complete his sale of the Omitted
Portion to the neighbor, BZW. This sale was completed behind Charlie's back in a series of
transactions occurring in 2013 which are discussed below. The later transfer to BZW required a
lot line adjustment, which could only occur if the 54 acres were put back together as one piece
which Ballard accomplished with this second "correction deed." His prior deed (the B&C Deed)
illegally carving off the 6 acres essentially had to be reversed in order for him to proceed with his
BZW scheme.
On August 30, 2012, Ballard executed yet a third deed of the entire 54 acres (which was
then in the name of S&R Realty, the Idaho limited liability company), this time wrongfully
transferring the entire 54 acres from S&R Realty in Idaho to an entity that Ballard formed in
Utah, S&R LLC, a Utah limited liability. 57 This deed was recorded on November 13, 2012. 58
Charlie had no idea of the transfer nor did she have any knowledge of this Utah entity. Ballard's
transfer of the property to a Utah entity in which Charlie was more than a mere violation of the
56
57

Trial Exhibit 24.
Trial Exhibit 25.

s8

Id.
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order - it is tantamount to misappropriation and conversion of the Salt Lake City Property. S&R
Realty (Utah) served no other purpose than a holding company for the unlawfully transferred
property and at no time during this litigation has S&R Realty (Utah) been lawfully entitled to
hold title to the property.
Continuing with his wrongful acts, on March 14, 2013, Ballard concurrently recorded
five instruments concerning the Salt Lake property (all at 11 :25 a.m.) in the Official Records of
Salt Lake County ("2013 Transactions") without any disclosure to Charlie. One instrument was
a deed transferring the approximately 6-acre Omitted Portion to the adjacent property owner,
BZW. 59 The property transferred to BZW approximately corresponds to the Omitted Portion,
which was omitted in the first transfer to B&C in the B&C Deed.
As noted above, the property originally deeded in the name of SMB (i.e., the 54 acres)
consisted of only one legal parcel, not two legal parcels, so Ballard's transfer of part of the 54
acres to BZW required a Lot Line Adjustment to make this transfer legally possible.
Accordingly, two of the other instruments in the 2013 Transactions were deeds which were
needed to effectuate a Lot Line Adjustment making the BZW Property and the other neighboring
property already owned by BZW one legal lot, and making the remaining property held by S&R
Realty, LLC another legal lot. These lot line adjustment deeds were (i) a Special Warranty
Deed executed by BZW in favor of BZW recorded March 14, 2013 ("BZW to BZW Deed") 60
and (ii) a Special Warranty Deed recorded March 14, 2013, executed by S&R Realty LLC, a
Utah limited liability company in favor of S&R Realty LLC, a Utah limited liability company
("S&R to S&R Deed") and signed by Ballard F. Smith as the Member of S&R Realty, LLC, a

59
60

Trial Exhibit 26.
Trial Exhibit 28.
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Utah limited liability company. 61 A fourth instrument was a deed of trust in favor of S&R
Realty, LLC, a Utah Limited liability company, encumbering the BZW property and securing a
note in the amount of $149,250 in favor of S&R Realty, LLC, a Utah limited liability company. 62
This secured a Note in the amount of $149,500 which was given by the buyer, BZW, as part of
the purchase money for the land.

Finally and most curiously, the fifth instrument that was

recorded in this same transaction was a deed of trust essentially in favor of Ballard's real estate
broker/agent in this transaction, Charlie Davis, (the deed of trust was made out to Charlie Davis'
company, Commerce Real Estate Solutions), encumbering the remaining S&R Realty, LLC
property (the 48-acre portion not sold).

It is unclear to this day, even after the court received testimony from Ballard and Charlie
Davis, why Ballard gave a note and deed of trust to Charlie Davis's brokerage firm in connection
with the sale of the BZW property. What is clear is that Ballard unlawfully encumbered the
remaining 48 acres without Charlie's consent, and the note and deed of trust suggest some side
deal between Ballard and Charlie Davis. 63 Ballard has, under oath, feigned complete ignorance
about the details of this transaction when questioned in depositions and has failed to provide any
answers concerning the most questionable aspects of this deal. 64
2. Limited Liability Company Filings.
B&C Realty, LLC, was organized in Idaho, and the Articles of Organization were filed
with the Secretary of State for the State of Idaho on December 27, 1995. 65 The Articles of
Organization reflect Ballard and Charlie as the members. Annual Reports were filed every year
61
62

63
64
65

Trial
Trial
Trial
Trial
Trial

Exhibit 29.
Exhibit 27.
Exhibit 30.
Exhibit 94, Bate Stamp 827-29 at Tr., p. 93-99.
Exhibit 6.
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after that between 1996 and 2003 that show Ballard and Charlie as the members. 66 The LLC
administratively dissolved on March 11, 2005 67 due to Ballard's failure to file the appropriate
annual reports. An Application for Reinstatement was filed by Ballard on November 17, 2006. 68
Instead of showing Ballard and Charlie as members, the Reinstatement Annual Report shows
Ballard and his new wife, Loree R. Smith, as members, and Charlie's name, although originally
handwritten on the form, was crossed out and replaced with Loree R. Smith. 69
In 2007 and 2008, Ballard filed annual reports that show Loree Smith as a member
instead of Charlie Smith. 70 On September 27, 2010, without Charlie's knowledge, Ballard filed
an Amendment to Certificate of Organization wherein he changed the name of B&C Realty,
LLC to S&R Realty, LLC, leaving behind any connection in the public records to the
community-owned limited liability company referenced in the court orders. 71
On December 19, 2012, Ballard filed a Statement of Dissolution dissolving S&R Realty,
an Idaho limited liability company. 72 Ballard then formed the entity in Utah, discussed above,
S&R Realty LLC, a Utah limited liability company. The new entity was formed on or before
August 30, 2012, because on that date he transferred all of the 54- acre Salt Lake City prope1iy
from the Idaho S&R LLC to the Utah S&R LLC. 73 This transfer of the property to the Utah
LLC, without Charlie's knowledge or consent, removed Charlie entirely from any connection to
the property in the public records, which enabled Ballard to engage in all the wrongful acts
exposed at trial.
Trial Exhibits 7-14.
Trial Exhibit 15.
r,x Trial Exhibit 15.
19
'
Trial Exhibit 15.
70
Trial Exhibits 16 and 17.
71
Trial Exhibit 18.
72
Trial Exhibit 19.
73
Trial Exhibit 25.
(i(,
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3.

Ballard's Claim of Other Owners.

The 2007 Order clearly provides that the SMB property would be divided equally
between the parties. SMB owned approximately 54 acres. 74 The stipulation on the record before
the court was specifically to divide the stock in Sun Mountain Broadcasting:

The Court: My understanding is what we're doing
Mr. Pica: And then we're dividing we are dividing that asset,
basically, by --- I mean, dividing the stock .or dissolving the
corporation well, Ballard is agreeing to - and deed it over.
But, you know, any costs or obligations or anything that arises out
of that - I mean, it's a 50/50 deal going both ways. Okay. 75

Ballard argues that there are some other "shareholders" or other individuals that had an
ownership interest in SMB at the time he entered into the stipulation in 2007, and consequently,
they have an ownership interest in the Salt Lake Property. He further claimed that because of
this fact, the magistrate court was deprived of jurisdiction to enter the 2007 Order. The facts and
the law belie this argument.
The most glaring and obvious flaw in this argument is that yet again, Ballard's position
contradicts his own actions and the evidence.

The overwhelming substantial and competent

evidence at trial showed that there really are no other legitimate owners. Ballard certainly has
never acted as though there were other owners: (1) he represented to numerous third parties that
he (or B&C Realty, LLC) were the owners; (2) he represented numerous times in the Secretary
of State filings that B&C had only two members, Charlie and Ballard; (3) he submitted tax
returns for years claiming the property as his asset; (4) he retained I 00% of all rental income
from Clear Channcl/iHeart Media; (5) he reported all of the rental income on his personal tax

71

75

Trial Exhibit 20.
R., p. 489 at Tr. p. 4, L. 1-4; p. 19, L. l 9-25; p. 20, L.1-8 (emphasis added).
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returns; (6) he unilaterally partitioned and sold six acres without ever discussing it with other
"owners"; (7) he retained the sales proceeds from the sale of the six acres without sharing it with
other "owners"; and (8) he has never collected any payment for taxes on the property from other
"owners".
The evidence presented at trial shows that the SMB was dissolved on January 2, 1996. 76
The other members were paid out their capital share, and Ballard was to receive the title to the
Salt Lake Property as referenced in the Ernest Burger letter dated February 26, 1996. 77 That
letter indicates that the Salt Lake Grant Deed had already been prepared and executed, but not
yet recorded.

Mr. Burger states, "Please also note that the Salt Lake Grant Deed for the

transmitter tower area, transferring the property to your Idaho LLC, while executed, has not been
recorded yet. '' 78 This evidence, along with the fact that both Ballard and Charlie understood at
the time of the divorce that the Salt Lake Property was community property owned by the
community-owned company, B&C, would be consistent with this deed. Also, consistent with
this fact is that B&C filed tax returns that reported the income on the Salt Lake Property for
many years. 79

All of this evidence points to the undeniable conclusion that the Salt Lake

Property was deeded to a community-owned limited liability company by SMB at the time of the
dissolution of SMB, but that deed was not recorded.
As if this evidence were not sufficient alone, additional evidence shows that Ballard has
repeatedly represented to third parties that the Salt Lake Property is owned by Charlie and
himself and/or B&C. A good example is set forth in an email dated August 29, 2006; this email

'(] Trial
Trial
78
Trial
79
Trial

Exhibit 283.
Exhibit 283.
Exhibit 283.
Exhibits 280, 281, and 283.
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was sent prior to the parties stipulating to the 2007 Order. 80 Ballard states to Ann Berg at Clear
Channel, "The property is in an LLC named B&C Realty owned by my ex-wife and myself. The
check should be in the name of the LLC." 81
In an email dated August 8, 2008, Ballard represented to Stu Stanek at Clear Channel
that, "This is because B&C Realty, LLC, the owner of the property has the right to develop part
of the property. " 82 In another email sent four years later, on July 12, 2010, Ballard represented
to Stu Stanek at Clear Channel, 'The purpose of this letter is to inform you that B&C Realty
LLC considers the lease to be terminated ... " 83
In another email sent two years after that on December 13, 2012, Ballard represented to
Shelly Moreno at Clear Channel that, "Even though the California corporation that held the
assets of Sun Mountain was dissolved years ago, Ca. law allows the corporation to exist for the
purpose of disposing of assets. At the time of the dissolution, I was the sole shareholder." 84
·rhe evidence showed that the parties stipulated to the division of the ownership interest
of SMB, and there were no other owners of that stock. The only asset held by that entity-or
that stock ownership--was the Salt Lake Property. That stipulation was reduced to writing in
two separate court orders. Those orders were never appealed. Ballard disregarded those orders,
transferred title to a newly established entity, and partitioned and sold off some of the land
without Charlie~s knowledge and consent. It is because of all of the foregoing egregious acts
committed by Ballard that Charlie had no choice but to file a petition under Rule 809 and request

80

Trial Exhibit 85.
Trial Exhibit 85.
82
Trial Exhibit 76(t). There are numerous exhibits that contradict Ballard's position and it is not possible to cite to
every single one. Another example of the ownership is the fact that the community-owned BCS Prope1iies L.P. paid
expenses related to the Salt Lake Property while the parties were married. See Trial Exhibits 170, 178.
in Trial Exhibit 227.
81
' Trial Exhibit 240 (emphasis added).
81
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that he be removed from his charge with regard to the marketing and sale of the property. The
litigation culminated in four-days of trial. The magistrate court ultimately found that pursuant to
Rule 809 the term contained in the 2008 Order that placed Ballard in charge of the sale of the
Salt l ,ake Property should not be given prospective application and it appointed a receiver to
handle the sale of the property and related matters.

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

As an additional issue on appeal, Charlie asserts that she should be awarded her attorney
fees and costs in having to respond to Ballard's appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-121 and
12-107; and Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b)(4), 35(b)(5), 41 and Idaho Rule of Family Law
Procedure 908.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its intermediate
appellate capacity, this Comi directly reviews the district court's decision and the standard of
review is as follows, "The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." Papin v. Papin,_
Idaho

P.3d _, 2019 WL 6974276 (Idaho), *4; citing Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,529,

284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760
(2008)). "If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the
district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a
matter of procedure." Id. "Thus, this Court does not review the decision of the magistrate court.
Id. .;Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court."
Id.
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As stated by this Court, "this Court recognizes the long-established rule that our province
is to examine the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and that when findings of the
trial court are supported by competent, substantial evidence, they are binding and conclusive on
appeal." Martsch v. Martsch, 103 Idaho 142, 144, 645 P.2d 882, 884 (1982). "Findings cannot
be deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial, even though conflicting,
evidence in the record." In the Matter of the Estate o,f Logan, 120 Idaho 226, 231, 815 P.2d 35,
40 (Ct. App. 1991).
IV.

ARGUMENT

A. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's Decision that it
had Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
I. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's Finding

that the Evidence Established That at the Time of the Parties' Divorce
Sun Mountain Broadcasting had been Dissolved and the Salt Lake
Property had been Transferred to Ballard Smith.

Ballard claims that neither the magistrate court nor the district court had jurisdiction to
determine Ballard's interest, Charlie's interest, SMB 's interest, or any other entities' interest in
the Salt Lake Property.

The magistrate court did not determine anyone else's interest. The

magistrate court did determine Charlie's and Ballard's ownership interest in SMB, and had
jurisdiction to make such a determination because they stipulated to the ownership and division
as reflected in the 2007 Order that was entered more than ten years ago. Charlie and Ballard had
previously stipulated to the ownership and division of the Salt Lake Property in the Final Order
that was entered more than fourteen ago.
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The magistrate court found that, "At the time of the parties' divorce in 2003 SMB was
already dissolved and Ballard had ownership of the SLC Property." 85 The district court affirmed
this finding because it was supported by substantial and competent evidence at trial. The district
court held, "[T]here is substantial evidence in the record that the appellant obtained title to the
Salt Lake property at the dissolution of the corporation. The appellant stated he was the sole
shareholder of the corporation and that all of the corporations' assets had been distributed to the
persons entitled to them." 86
The district court further found, "The appellant acted like he was the sole owner of the
property, executing several deeds, selling part of it, and attempting to sell the remainder. His
actions and statements support the magistrate's determination that he was the sole owner of the
property, after the dissolution of the corporation." 87
The magistrate court's factual finding, and the district court's affirmance of those
findings, is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Ballard stipulated to divide the
stock in SMB back in 2007. Ballard asserts that the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction over the
Salt Lake Property based on his allegation that Salt Lake Property remained in SMB until it was
conveyed into S&R Realty, LLC. This allegation is contradicted by the evidence presented in at
trial and the record in this case. The evidence at trial established that:
( 1) Sun Mountain Broadcasting was dissolved on January 2, 1996, when a Certificate of
Dissolution was filed with the Secretary of State of the State of California as Instrument No.
D512807.

85
86
87

88

88

R., p. 303.
R .. p. 409.
IL p. 409.
Trial Exhibit 283.
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(2) At the same time, on January 2, 1996, a Certification of Election to Wind Up and
Dissolve was concurrently filed with the Secretary of State of the State of California as
Instrument No. DS 12806. 89
(3) In the Certificate of Dissolution, Ballard certified under "penalty of perjury" that,

"The Corporation [had] elected to wind up and dissolve. The affairs of the Corporation [were]
completely wound up. The Corporation's known debts and liabilities [were] actually paid." 90 He
further signed under penalty of perjury that, "The Corporation's known assets have been

distributed to the persons entitled thereto." 91

Ballard also confirmed in the Certificate of

Dissolution that he was the "sole member of the board of directors of Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. " 92
(4) As part of the dissolution and winding up of affairs of SMB, the Salt Lake Property

vvas transferred to Ballard's and Charlie's "Idaho LLC". Exhibit 283 is a letter from attorney
Ernest Berger that included the original certified copy of the Certificate of Dissolution and the
Certificate of Election to Wind Up and Dissolve for Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. and that
also enclosed an executed "Salt Lake Grant Deed" transferring the property to Ballard's "Idaho
LLC". The letter states, "Please also note that the Salt Lake Grant Deed for the transmitter tower
area transferring the property to your Idaho LLC, while executed, has not been recorded yet." 93
1

While Ballard has never produced the deed, and it has not been recorded, the lack of recordation
does not affect the validity of the deed. The recordation is simply for notice purposes. The

89
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undisputed evidence is that the corporation was wound up and, as sworn under penalty of perjury
by Ballard, the property was distributed.
Regardless of whether the deed was or was not recorded, the overwhelming evidence also
supports the finding that the Salt Lake Property was transferred to Ballard upon dissolution. In
all respects, Ballard has acted as the owner of the Salt Lake Property.
a.

Ballard's tax returns reflect that he reported all of the income generated on
the Salt Lake Property on his personal tax returns and/or B&C Realty,
LLC 's tax returns.

Ballard's tax returns for 2008 through 2011 were marked and admitted as Trial Exhibits
43 through 4 7. All of the returns for these years reflect that Ballard reported all of the lease
income from Clear Channel (n/k/a iHeart Media) on his personal tax returns. 94 For example,
Schedule E on his 2012 tax returns reflect rent received on the Salt Lake Property of $24,186. 95
Schedule E on his 2011 returns reflect rent received on the Salt Lake Property of $13,965. 96 The
2010, 2009, and 2008 returns all show the same amount in rental income. 97
The partnership returns for B&C Realty, LLC filed in 1999, 2002, and 2003 (the only
years that Charlie was able to locate for exhibits) reflect that B&C Realty, LLC reported all of
the Salt Lake Prope1iy income. 98
The income reported is the lease income for Clear Channel (n/k/a iHeart Media). The
Easement and Right-of-Way Agreement entered on November 14, 1995, contains a provision in
paragraph 5 for calculating the annual lease, with an amount set at $7,500 and increasing or

94

Trial Exhibits 43-48.
Trial Exhibit 43, Bate Stamped
appears to be for two payments.
96
Trial Exhibit 44, Bate Stamped
97
Trial Exhibit 45, Bate Stamped
Pet00571.
98
Trial Exhibit 70, Bate Stamped
95

PLF00328. The check is written to B&C Realty, LLC. See Exhibit 224. This
PLF00404.
PLF000461; Exhibit 46, Bate Stamped Pet00520; Exhibit 47, Bate Stamped
PET00992; 280, 281, and 282.
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decreasing based on fair market value. 99 This agreement was later amended by First Amendment
to Easement and Right-of-Way Agreement dated December 20, 2012, that increased the lease
payments. 100 Notably, there are no other shareholders identified on either of these agreements.
No other individuals have reported the income on the property.
During Ballard's deposition taken on May 15, 2015, Ballard testified that all of the lease
payments are written to S&R Realty, LLC, and deposited into an account with S&R Realty.
Ballard entered into a Settlement and Release Agreement dated December 20, 2012, between
Citicasters 101 and S&R Realty, LLC, and was paid a sum of $40,000 related to the lease of the
towers. Ballard testified that he deposited the $40,000 and the lease payments into an S&R Bank
account.

102

S&R Realty, LLC is the entity Ballard formed with his wife, Loree Smith. 103

In 2007,

Ballard filed his annual report for B&C Realty, LLC, but replaced Charlie as a member with his
wife, Loree Smith. 104 In 2010, Ballard filed an Amendment and changed the name of B&C
Realty, LLC to S&R Realty, LLC. 105 He then filed a Statement of Dissolution of S&R Realty,
LLC formerly B&C Realty, LLC. 106 Ballard testified that he did all of this because his wife did

not like to be reminded of Charlie, and he transferred the entity to Utah. The testimony was as
follows:

Q. So are you saying that this dissolution did not affect Charlie's rights to
ownership?
Trial Exhibit 39, Bate Stamped Pet00302.
Trial Exhibit 4 l.
101
Citicasters was a subsidiary of Clear Channel. Clear Channel (now known as iHeaii Media) leases the radio
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A. No_ 101
Notably, there are no other "shareholders" identified on any of the annual reports filed by Ballard
Smith. 108 According to his testimony, Charlie is the other owner, despite the designation of his
wife as a member. Notably, no other "shareholders" received any portion of the rental income or
the $40,000 payment. Also, no other "shareholders" identified in the Settlement and Release
Agreement that is expressly entered into between S&R Realty, LLC. Ballard's testimony, tax
filings, and contracts do not support his claim that there are other shareholders.

b.

The numerous deeds executed by Ballard contradict his claim.

The magistrate court admitted into evidence at trial numerous deeds that were executed
by Ballard transferring the interest in the Salt Lake City Property (in direct violation of the court
order). Petitioner's Trial Exhibits 24-26, and 29 are all deeds executed and recorded by Ballard
Smith and not a single deed references any other individual or entity that has an ownership
interest in the property.
Ballard executed all of the forgoing deeds, with the exception of the initial one, in order
to partition out and sell approximately 6 acres and oddly, he testified that he consulted with none

of the other "owners" prior to selling a piece of property that they allegedly had an ownership
interest in:

Q. When you transferred the BZW property, the five acres, which
was originally deeded in the name of Sun Mountain Broadcasting,
Inc., did you get the other shareholders consent to that?
A. No.

Q. Why not?
107
108

Trial Exhibit 94, Bate Stamp 812 at Tr., p. 33-36, L. 2.
Trial Exhibits 16 and 17.
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A. Because I didn't think about it. 109

It is simply not credible that if there were, in fact, other owners with interest in the
property that there would be no mention made to them that property they owned was being
partitioned and sold and they would receive no proceeds. No other owners were identified on the
closing documents when Ballard sold the six acres. 110 Ballard's actions and testimony show
more credibility issues with this claim. Further, Ballard testified:
Q. Has Paul ever presented to you any documentatio n which would
indicate he would have a right to any proceeds from this property?

A. No. But there is no reason to. Because I agreed he has got an interest
in it. It is an undistributed asset.
Q. But that interest was never documented at the time of dissolution of the
company; is that correct?
A.

No.111

Apparently, there is no written documentation to show that there were other owners in the
property at the time of the divorce. This all appears to be a verbal arrangement that only Ballard
knows about. He testified that this arrangement is all verbal between him and the other owners.
There can be no other conclusion drawn other than that Ballard was the sole owner of the interest
in SMB when the final order was entered and when the parties entered into the stipulation.

c. Ballard's representations to third parties.
The owners of the towers located on the property, iHeart Media (formerly Clear
Channel), pay rent pursuant to a lease agreement. 112 In response to a subpoena, iHeart Media

109
110
111
1
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Exhibit 56, Bate Stamp 858 at Tr., p. 216, L. 4-10.
Exhibits 209 and 221.
Exhibit 56, Bate Stamp 855-56 at Tr., p. 205, L. 10-25; p. 206, L. 1-3.
Exhibit 41.
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produced hundreds of pages of documents that included email correspondence between Ballard
and individuals employed by iHeart Media regarding the terms of the lease agreements over the
years.

In an email sent by Ballard to employee Ann Berg on August 29, 2006, Ballard

represented, "The property is in a [sic] LLC named B&C Realty owned by my ex-wife and myself.
The check should be in the name of the LLC." 113
In a letter from Ballard to Stu Stanek sent on January 26, 2010, he signed in his capacity
on behalf of B&C Realty LLC. 114 In another email from Ballard dated July 13, 2010 he stated,
··The purpose of this letter is to inform you that B&C Realty LLC considers the leased to be
terminated that there are no restrictions on our use of our property." 115
In an email to Shelly Moreno at Clear Channel dated December 13, 2012 Ballard
represented to her that, "At the time of the dissolution, I was the sole shareholder." 116
Ballard represented to the lessee both before he placed the stipulation on the record on
April 20, 2007 and C?fier he placed the stipulation on the record that the Salt Lake Property was
owned by B&C, and that he and Charlie were the owners of that entity.

These statements

directly contradict the position he is taking now-that there are other owners with interest in the
property.

d. Ballard's testimony.
As set forth above, according to Ballard's testimony, there is no documented evidence
that shows there are other owners with an interest in the property. Rather, he asserted that S&R

113
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Exhibit 143.
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Realty, LLC (the renamed B&C Realty, LLC) is holding the property "for the benefit of people
that had an interest." 117 In his deposition taken on October 31, 2014, he testified as follows:

Ms. Whatcott:

Are you managing it as an entity or individually?

Ballard Smith:
No. I was the manager of the property for Sun
Mountain.
And the shareholders of Sun Mountain, the original
shareholders, agreed I managed the property. The property is now being
held in a Utah LLC for the benefit of all the people who had stock in Sun
Mountain originally and your client now, who has half the stock.

Q.

What entity is that?

A.

That's holding the property?

Q.

Correct.

A.

S&R Realty, LLC.

Q.

So are the members of Sun Mountain also members of S&R?

A.
No. S&R is holding the property for the benefit of the people that
had an interest in the property through Sun Mountain Broadcasting. 118
The document referred to by Ballard is a document titled "Agreement Regarding Property
Ownership and Expenses." 119

This document was prepared by Ballard, and based on the

signature lines, was allegedly signed by the individuals in May of 2013. 120 Markedly, this was
prepared years after the stipulation. The document sets forth no ownership interests.

It does provide in Paragraph 8 that, "If any shareholder decides not to pay his past or
future share of these reasonable and necessary expenses, said shareholder agrees to sell his share
to S&R for $1 and S&R agrees to assume that shareholder's pro rata share of those expenses and

117
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Trial Exhibit 52, Tr., p. 29, L. 7-25; p. 30, L. 1-7.
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Trial Exhibit 51.
Trial Exhibit 5 l.
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to indemnify such shareholder for any and all liability ... " 121

Therefore, if any of the

"shareholders" of the defunct corporation didn't want to pay expenses, then their share was
basically sold to S&R Realty, LLC for $1 and debt forgiveness. Therefore, the only way to
know whether anyone else still has an "interest" in the property is Ballard's word.
Furthermore, the foregoing alleged "shareholders" to which Ballard continuously
references are not current shareholders, but former shareholders as he has unequivocally testified
to because it is a defunct corporation. 122
At trial Ballard testified that none of the other "owners" were ever sent a bill related to
any of the alleged expenses:

Q.
Isn't it true that from 1995 to 2005 you never sent a bill to
any of the other alleged owners of Sun Mountain stock or the
property for their share of any of the expenses on the real property
located in Utah?
A.

I'm sorry, from 1995 to 2005?

Q.

Yes.

A.

No, I didn't send anybody a bill. 123

Q.
And from 2005 when the divorce was entered up until
2007, 2008 when these orders were entered by Judge Day and
Judge Reardon, you never sent a bill to any other alleged
shareholder or owner, somebody with ownership interest in the real
property, correct?
A. Correct. 124

Ballard testified on the first day of trial that:
121

122

123
124

Trial Exhibit 51.
Trial Exhibit 52, Tr., p. 37, L. 21-24.
Tr. p. 124, L. 5-12.
Tr., p. 126, L. 5-10.
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Mr. Welsh: And Sun Mountain Broadcasting was dissolved in
1995, isn't that true?
Ballard Smith:

Yes

Q.
And in 1995 upon it being dissolved, B&C Realty, LLC,
was formed to hold the real property that had been owned by Sun
Mountain, isn't that true?
A.

Yes. 125

He further testified:

Q.
And Sun Mountain was dissolved - you already
testified you formed B&C Realty, LLC, in 1995 to hold the
property that had been in Sun Mountain, correct?
A.

I'm sorry. Hold the property, what?

Q.
To hold the real property that had been owned by
you a formed the LLC in 1995 to hold the real property that had
been owned by Sun Mountain, correct?
A. Yes.

Q. And, in fact, at least up to some point in time you filed
tax returns for the LLC, correct?
A. Yes.

Q. And those tax returns reflected that it owned the real
property that had been owned by Sun Mountain, correct?
A. Yes. 126

Also, Ballard testified:
A.
I don't understand the relevance, because under the order of
2007 we dealt with the stock of Sun Mountain Broadcasting, and I
voluntarily agreed at that time that even through it wasn't a
community asset, that she had an interest in the land. So I'm
i:is Tr., p. 24, L. 9-15. Ballard's testimony contradicted the deed he signed that indicated that SMB was dissolved
after the deed. See Trial Exhibit 94, Bate Stamp 825 at Tr., p. 82, L. 12-21. See also, Ex. 283.
126
Tr., p. 32, L. 14-25; p. 33, L. l-3.
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not quite sure what the relevance of this is, because, yes, I admit
she has an interest in the property per the final order. 127
Ballard claimed that the reason he transferred the property from B&C to S&R Realty,
LLC (Idaho) and then to S&R Realty, LLC (Utah) was because "the LLC owned the property of
the people that owned an interest in the real property." 128 It is odd that he would decide to set up
new LLCs in direct contradiction to the court orders and years after the court orders were entered
to protect these other "owners." Even more incredible, that none of the other "owners" held any
interest in any of the entities for which he transferred the property into. He testified to that as
follows:

Q.

Isn't it true that in no LLC document from 1995 to the
present date, whether it be in the annual statement, in any written
document anywhere in any of the LLC documents, you never
claimed, other than Charlie Smith and the couple years you
claimed Lori, your current wife, other than those two, you never
listed any other members in the LLC, correct?
A. Correct. 129

The alleged other owners who have some unidentifiable interest in the Salt Lake Property
have an interest based upon some oral handshake deal with Ballard Smith. The overwhelming
evidence before the magistrate court is that there is no other individual who currently holds a
direct ownership interest in the Salt Lake Property.
Ballard's argument is not supported by law either. He argues that because the Salt Lake
Property was held by an entity, whether it be SMB or S&R Realty, LLC, and was not held
individually in the name of the parties that the magistrate court never had jurisdiction to dispose

or that property. This is simply incorrect.
1 7
:~

128
129

Tr., p. 35, L. 18-25 (emphasis added).
Tr., p. 62, L. 7-8.
Tr., p. 62, L. 9-16.
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The parties stipulated before the Court that SMB was

an omitted community asset and that to dispose of the asset, Ballard would cause its assets to be
transferred to B&C, and then Ballard was stipulated to dissolve that entity and sell the
property. 130
There was a discussion on the record during the April 20, 2007 hearing about the court
having jurisdiction over the shares of SMB, rather than the real property asset, Judge Day stated
that the parties were stipulating as follows: "The parties, by their stipulation have agreed that I
can enter an order that Ballard will assign all of that stock to B & C Realty, LLC, and then B &
C Realty, LLC will be wound up to the extent possible and the assets sold." 131 Even Ballard's
counsel acknowledged his client's ownership of the stock and that the stock would be
assigned. 132 Ballard's counsel stipulated that "we are ... dividing the stock or dissolving the
corporation - well, Ballard is agreeing to ... " 133
Ballard's argument that the deed is in the name of an entity and therefore, the magistrate
court had no jurisdiction is frivolous.

The stock in SMB was ordered to be included in the

division of assets as an omitted asset.

Ballard was ordered to transfer that asset to the

community-owned B&C. The court then ordered that Ballard was to wind up and dissolve that
LLC with the parties dividing the assets. Rather than transfer the prope1iy into B&C, Ballard
created a new entity and transferred title to that entity in which Charlie was not a member. How
he can argue that this conduct does not violate the court orders is inexcusable. There is no
question the magistrate court had jurisdiction over Ballard Smith. There is also no question that

130

The evidence shows that the property had already been deeded to Ballard's "Idaho LLC" as paii of the winding
up of Sun Mountain Broadcasting but since that deed wasn't recorded and since fee title records then showed Sun
Mountain Broadcasting as still owning the property at the time of the Couti's Orders, the Court ordered the property
to be deeded to B&C Realty.
131
R., p. 493 at Tr., p. 21, L. 5-9.
m Id.
J:D Id.
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the magistrate court has the power to enforce its own orders and can clearly direct Ballard to
transfer the property back to B&C to come into compliance with the order. Simply put, a party
cannot deprive a court of jurisdiction or take away its power by virtue of a fraudulent transfer.
It is well-established in Idaho that in divorce actions the courts have the power to allocate
stock ownership at divorce. See Reed v. Reed, 157 Idaho 705, 339 P.3d 1109 (2014) (husband
was awarded the stock ownership and wife was awarded a monetary judgment equal to one-half
the value of the stock).

Likewise, the courts also have the power to sell community-owned

stock. Simplot v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 526 P.2d 844 (1974). The parties were the only members of
B&C and stipulated to it being wound up and dissolved.
The district court addressed Ballard's jurisdictional argument at length. It cited to and
analyzed substantial case law and specifically rejected Ballard's reliance on Andre v. Morrow,
106 Idaho 455, 680 P.2d 1355 (1984), and explained why that case, and others cited, actually
support Charlie's position. The district comi cited to Andre and reiterated, "The following line
of cases establishes that a foreign court has the power to indirectly affect out-of-state
property by means of a decree, based on personal juris icon over the parties, which
determines the parties' personal rights or equities in that property." 134

The mere fact that the Salt Lake Prope1iy is not located in Idaho does not impact the
jurisdiction in the slightest. It mandates no requirement that only Utah has the jurisdiction to
address any issues related to this property.

In divorce cases, courts have quasi in rem

jurisdiction. That means the court has jurisdiction over the parties as well as the authority to
divide property. "Without doubt the court having acquired jurisdiction of the parties is entitled

134
R., p. 364, citing Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459, 461 and n.2, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359, 1361 and n.2
( 1984 )( emphasis included in Opinion on Appeal).
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to award real property which is situated in another state, and equally without doubt it may
enforce its determination via in personam orders requiring conveyances under penalty of
contempt. Equally without doubt, a court in doing so is not trying title to real property nor
affecting title to real property, but simply by determining who gets what, and ordering
conveyances with it can enforce by contempt processes where the parties are variable in such
process.'' Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,680 P.2d 1355 (1984).
The magistrate has always had personal jurisdiction over the parties and can direct the
parties to do or not to do things in a divorce action. Moreover, in this case, the parties stipulated
to do and not to do things that the court has the power to enforce once memorialized in a court
order. The district court did not err. The magistrate court did not err.

Ballard has simply

continued to change position over the course of the years in an attempt to completely deprive
Charlie her interest in the community property allocated to her.

1. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's Decision
that the Salt Lake City Property is Community Property.
Ballard's claim that the Salt Lake Property is not community property is frivolous. He
stipulated in the Final Order entered in 2005 that the Salt Lake Property was community property
and it would be sold and the proceeds divided. He stipulated to the 2007 Order that SMB was an
omitted asset and the stock would be divided and the Salt Lake Property would be transferred to
B&C and sold. He stipulated to the 2008 Order placing him in charge of the sale of the Salt
Lake Property.

Ballard stipulated to all of the aforementioned orders and they were never

appealed.
The district court found, "The magistrate did not err in finding that the court had
jurisdiction over the sale of the Salt Lake property. The appellant stipulated that the Salt Lake
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property was community property and that it would be sold and ' [u]pon sale, each party shall
receive one-half of the net proceeds from the sale. '" 135 This property was stipulated to be
community property in 2005, and more stipulations and orders followed confirming that.
The parties later stipulated that the stock in SMB was an omitted asset and divided that.
The parties stipulated that Ballard would then execute a deed transferring title to B&C and the
property would be sold and the proceeds divided. This is not an issue about jurisdiction, despite
Ballard's attempts to contort it into one. The character and allocation of this asset were resolved
long ago and cannot be changed.

It is well-established that ownership of a member interest, units, or stock in a company
can be characterized as separate or community property in a divorce action. See Josephson v .
.Josephson. 115 Idaho 1142, 772 P.2d 1236 (Ct.App.1989)(overruled on other grounds).

Furthermore, a magistrate court has the power to divide and distribute community stock, which is
exactly what Judge Day did and clarified at the time the parties placed the stipulation on the
record. As the Court of Appeals explained in Josephson, "The decision to divide and distribute
the community stock to the parties, as with all property distribution questions, is a matter of trial
court discretion .. .'The magistrate determined it was unnecessary to find a value for the stock
because he was dividing it equally between the parties." Josephson, 115 Idaho at 1149, 772 P.2d
at 1243.
In Hunt v. Hunt, I IO Idaho 649, 718 P .2d 560 (Ct. App. 1985), the divorce decree
awarded husband and wife one of a total of three shares of the stock in a corporation as well as
various assets held by the corporation. The third-party shareholder was not a party to the action

m R., p. 405.
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and did not preclude this person from taking appropriate legal action if dissatisfied with the
division.
Ballard sets forth in two separate arguments in his brief that the Salt Lake Property is not
community property because he makes a substantially similar argument in Section III of his
Legal Argument.

Charlie addresses that argument below in Section B in more detail and

specifically, the effect of the binding stipulations, judicial estoppel, and judicial admissions.
Therefore, Charlie incorporates that argument by reference herein.
2. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's Holding that it had
.Jurisdiction to Enter the Order Re: April 20, 2007 Hearing.
The district court properly affirmed the magistrate court's finding that it had subject
matter jurisdiction when it entered the 2007 Order and the 2008 Order. These orders were never
challenged or appealed until Ballard raised the issue in this litigation that was brought by Charlie
more than five years after the 2008 Order was entered. The orders became final after forty-two
days, and therefore Ballard's arguments are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 136
Charlie does not dispute that as of the date of the divorce the deed to the property was in
the name of SMB. The parties stipulated to the division of the real property in the divorce. The
parties stipulated in 2007 that SMB was an omitted asset, and the stock would be equally
divided. The parties stipulated that Ballard would execute a deed placing title in B&C. He then
ignored the stipulations, changed positions, and violated the court orders. The district court
found, "However, substantial evidence supports the magistrate's conclusion that at the time of
the parties' divorce, Sun Mountain Broadcasting no longer had a corporate existence.

136

Notably, even after almost a year had passed from the time Ballard entered the stipulation in April of 2007, he
was negotiating a buyout of the property with Charlie. See Trial Exhibits 104 and 105. Oddly, there was no
mention of jurisdiction or ownership issues that he now raises again. See Trial Exhibits 57-60.
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Pctitioner~s Exhibit 283 provides that the appellant dissolved Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc.,
as a corporation on December 22, 1995 (which was filed on January 2, 1996), prior to the time of
the parties' 2003 divorce." 137
The magistrate addressed this issue at length and stated in part, "At the time of the
parties' divorce in 2003, SMB was already dissolved and Ballard had ownership of the SLC
Property" and "Ballard's actions of claiming of the rental profits and expenses on his personal
income tax returns are indicative that the SLC Property was his sole property. The court had
jurisdiction over the stock contained in SMB the moment Ballard stipulated that it was a
community asset." 138
The foregoing finding is supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Ballard

attempts to contort his challenge into a jurisdictional argument, but it is not jurisdictional, and his
label assigning it as such is a misnomer. Ballard argues that the magistrate court did not have
jurisdiction because at the time of the parties' divorce in 2003, the real property was owned by
SMB. SMB was dissolved as a corporation in 1996. 139 The evidence at trial established that
Ballard and Charlie were the sole owners of the community property asset at the time the parties
were divorced, exclusive of other possible shareholder interests.

The substantial evidence

showed that Ballard also treated the Salt Lake Property as a community asset in the parties' tax
returns. He claimed all income and expenses on his personal tax returns. The magistrate court
had jurisdiction over the parties and the ownership interests in SMB, and that finding was
properly affirmed by the district court.

137

R., p. 354.

118

R., p. 303.

139

Trial Exhibit 283.
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3. The Magistrate Court had Jurisdiction to Consider Charlie's Second Amended
Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 and Charlie Had Standing.

Ballard argues now that Charlie lacked standing to file the Second Amended Petition to
Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809. Based upon a review of Ballard's prior appeal brief to the
district court, it appears that this is the first time this standing issue to file the motion has been
raised and should be deemed waived. Harrentsian v. Hill, 161 Idaho 332, 340-41, 385 P.3d 887,
895-96 (2016).
According to Ballard, Charlie lacked standing to file a motion under Rule 809 because
·'she has never held title to the Salt Lake Property" and "Title to the Salt Lake Property has
always been held by a third party legal entity (e.g. Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. at the time
of the parties' divorce and S&R Realty, LLC at the time of trial)." 140 These statements are, at
best, misleading as Ballard conveniently omits the fact that title to the property was held by B&C
by virtue of a deed executed by Ballard. Ballard and Charlie are the only members of B&C.
Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 21 is the Special Warranty Deed executed by Ballard Smith
transferring the title from SMB to B&C on January 23, 2008. 141 Ballard executed this deed as
ordered by the magistrate court in the 2007 Order. 142
Also, Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 24 is a subsequent deed, also executed by Ballard, that
''replaces" the prior deed and instead transfers title from SMB to S&R Realty, LLC and it states
that, "S&R Realty, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company formerly known as B&C Realty,
LLC:' 143 From that point forward, it was Ballard that unilaterally proceeded to transfer title to

the property to other entities and then he turns around and argues that Charlie lacks standing
140
141
142

143

Appellant's Brief, p. 17.
Albeit omitted approximately 6 acres.
R., p. 215.
Petitioner's Exhibit 24 (emphasis added).
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because she did not hold title. Ballard's malfeasance and misconduct cannot and do not deprive
the court of its jurisdiction.
Ballard then proceeds to argue that because Charlie never had an interest in the property,
she had no standing to bring an action under Rule 809. He cites no legal authority for that
proposition. Ballard's argument that, "the district court erred when it didn't recognize that the
magistrate court did not have jurisdiction because Charlie did not have standing," 144 yet it
appears that Ballard never raised the standing issue to the district court. Ballard also cites to the
following quote from the district court alleging error, "To the extent that the appellant asserts
B&C and S&R Realty are not parties to this action and that their absence deprived the Comi of
jurisdiction, failure to join an indispensable party is an affirmative defense that is required to be
raised either by motion or in a responsive pleading, which the appellant failed to do." 145
The district court was referring to this Court's decision the district court's reference to
this Court's decision in the Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,432 P.3d 6 (2018) wherein
Vernon Smith attempted to make a jurisdictional argument, like Ballard is making here, alleging
that some third parties are really at interest. "Vernon's argument is not really about a lack of
personal jurisdiction. Rather, his claim of error stems from the fact that VHS Properties was not
joined as an indispensable party ... The problem with this argument is that the failure to join an
indispensable party is an affirmative defense that must be raised in a responsive pleading or by
motion." 146 Matter of the Estate a/Smith, 164 Idaho at 469,432 P.3d at 18.
Ballard urged the same argument as Vernon Smith did in the Matter of Estate of Smith.
He claimed that the magistrate court lacked subject matter because SMB, B&C, and S&R Realty,
111
' ·
145

Appellant's Brief: p. 18.
R., p. 415.

146

R., p. 416.
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LLC were not parties to the action. The district court correctly relied upon the Matter of Estate
o_f'Smith and rejected the argument. With regard to Charlie's alleged lack of standing, at no time

did Ballard articulate or argue a lack of standing by Charlie in Appellant's Brief to the district
court, and this argument is being raised for the first time on appeal to this Court and should be
deemed waived.

B. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's Holding
that the Stock in Sun Mountain Broadcasting is Not Ballard's Separate
Property and he is Estopped from that Argument Entirely.
In an attempt to get out of the stipulation Ballard made ten years ago, he argues that
although he stipulated that his interest in SMB was an omitted asset and would be divided, but he
never stipulated that it was community. This argument is frivolous and fails for a number of
reasons. The magistrate court rejected this argument and so did the district court. He also again
tries to contort this argument into a jurisdictional argument when it is not a jurisdictional issue.
He stipulated to the inclusion and divi~ion of an asset. The district court properly held that,
"appellant is judicially stabled from now arguing that the Salt Lake property was not community
property and in arguing that he had no ability to deed it over so that it could be sold and the
proceeds divided equally between the respondent and him, which is what he said he could and
would do.'' 147
First, Ballard is bound by his stipulation. According to Idaho law, parties who enter into
stipulations are bound thereby. See Ratliff'v. Ratlfff, 129 Idaho 422, 925 P.2d 1121 (1996); and
Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 655 P.2d 926 (1982).

In

Ratlfff, the Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the Magistrate Court's interpretation of a transcript

of a hearing indicating that the parties stipulated to a change in custody, and thereby held that
147

R., p. 410.
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Naomi Ratliff could not ignore the stipulation that was represented before the Magistrate Court
and properly denied her motion for reconsideration. Ratliff, supra.
Ballard stipulated to these orders and those stipulations are binding judicial admissions
that dispose of a fact in controversy

such as the character and the allocation of an asset. Ballard

ignores the fact that he judicially admitted that SMB was an omitted communi ty asset and that
the assets held by SMB would be transferred to B&C. That asset was subsequently transferred to
B&C. The stipulation included the following:
Mr. Pica: One last thing, just as a point of clarification. Now,
Sun Mountain Broadcasting - we are treating that as an omitted
asset. Okay?

The Court: Yes. I did want to clarify that, and I appreciate that.
Mr. Pica: Okay.

The Court: My understanding is what we 're doingMr. Pica: And then we're dividing we are dividing that asset,
basically, by - I mean dividing the stock or dissolving the
corporation - well, Ballard is agreeing to - and deed it over. But,
you know, any costs of obligations or anything that arises out of
that - I mean, it's a 50/50 deal going both ways. Okay. 148

The Court: Just so the record is clear about technically, legally
what is going on here is they're - part of the final order, back in
June of 2005, had to do with the division of the property that we
have ben referring to, generally, as the Salt Lake property.
In fact, the court may not have had jurisdicti on to divide
that property because that property was owned by Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, which was a separate corporation. It was not owned
individually by either party or as communi ty property.
But Sun Mountain Broadcasting had shares of stock, of
course, that the court would have had jurisdicti on to divide and that
stock was not---arguably, it wasn't divided by that final order.
148

R., p. 492 at Tr., p. 19, L. 19-25; p. 20, I. 1-8 (emphasis added).
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So what we are doing now is recognizing that, rather than
dividing the property, what this court has the power to do is
address the stock in Sun Mountain Broadcasting.
The parties, by their stipulation, have agreed that I can
enter an order that Ballard will assign all of that stock to B&C
Realty, LLC; and then B&C Realty, LLC will be wound up to the
extent possible and the assets sold. 149
The transcript clearly sets forth the stipulations of the parties. Judge Day was simply
commenting that at the time the original order was entered, if Sun Mountain Broadcasting held
the Salt Lake Property, the Court cannot necessarily reach through a corporation directly to the
assets and award the assets, without characterizing and awarding the corporation. Therefore, all
parties stipulated before the magistrate court that SMB was an omitted community asset and that
in order to dispose of the asset, Ballard would transfer the assets of SMB to B&C and then
dissolve that entity and sell the property. The stipulation constitutes a judicial admission. The
assets

or B&C were ordered to be wound up and dissolved and the proceeds divided.
"A judicial admission is a statement made by a party or attorney, in the course of judicial

proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the
opposing party of some fact." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139
Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004); Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618-19, 930
P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1997). "Generally, judicial admissions remove the admitted facts
rrom the field of controversy." Strouse, 129 Idaho 618,930 P.2d at 1363.

Second, there is no law in Idaho, and Ballard has cited to no legal authority by way of
rule, statute or case law that would require that a stipulation or a court order must include a

1'1')

R., p. 492 at Tr., p. 19, L. 19-25; p. 20, L. 1-25; p. 21, L. 1-9. ( emphasis added).
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designation of the character of the asset being divided. If an issue is not supported by any
factual showing or by submission of legal authority, it is not presented for the trial court's
decision. Balser v. Kootenai County Board o.f Commissioners, 110 Idaho 37, 40, 714 P.2d. 6, 9
( 1986). If this argument being urged by Ballard had any merit, then most divorce decrees would
be subject to collateral attack years after they are entered. In many, many divorce cases, parties
forgo making a separate property claim where the claim may arise, and instead stipulate to divide
or even allocate the asset to the other spouse. Very rarely do the court orders dividing property
ever explicitly state that an asset (or a debt) is designated as "community" or "separate".
Fourth, Ballard is estopped by the law from changing his position now by the doctrine of
equitable estoppel.

Several Idaho cases have set forth the required elements of equitable

estoppel as follows: "The essential elements of an equitable estoppel as related to the party
estopped are: ( 1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material
facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than,
and inconsistent with, those which the parties subsequently attempt to assert; (2) intention, or at
least expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party; (3) knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the real facts."

Charpentier v. Welch, 74 Idaho 242, 248, 259 P.2d 814, 817

(1953); Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551,559,381 P.2d 802,806 (1963). "As related to the party
claiming the estoppel, they are: (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the
truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party stopped; and (3) action
based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially." Id.
According to this Court's prior holding, "the essence of the proper application of the
doctrine of quasi estoppel is the focus of the Court's attention upon the specific facts and
circumstances of the case at bar. KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 282, 486 P.2d 992, 995
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF P -45SWW/mew 16328-009/189230I

1/28/20 2:06:53 PM

( 197 l ). In Deutz-Allias Credit Corp, this Court held that a party may not maintain a position

inconsistent with a position previously taken, if, by taking the previous position, the party has
gained some advantage for itself, or produced some disadvantage to another party, or induced
another party to change its position.

Deutz-Allias Credit Corp. v. Bakie Logging, 121 Idaho

247, 824 P.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1992).
This case has nothing to do with jurisdiction. Ballard cannot now change his position and
assert that the property is his sole and separate prope1iy, and therefore it cannot be divided, and
the court does not have jurisdiction. His dispute as to the character or allocation of this asset has
long since run and his appeal time as well. The district court properly affirmed the magistrate
court in rejecting his argument.
C. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's
Appointment of a Receiver.
1. The District Court Properly Held that the Magistrate Court had Jurisdiction to
Appoint a Receiver.

Ballard argues that the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction to appoint a receiver because
Charlie's pleadings were allegedly deficient. This argument is yet another example of Ballard's
attempt to contort every legal argument into a jurisdictional argument. Charlie properly pied her
petition under Rule· 809. In her Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809
she requested. ··In the alternative, Charlie requests that a mutually agreeable receiver be
appointed to handle the approximately forty-eight unsold acres that remain and that the net
proceeds be divided equally." 150 The 2008 Order directed that B&C be wound up and dissolved,
it is not uncommon for a receiver to be appointed in the dissolution of limited liability
compames.
150

R., p. 281.
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Idaho law applies liberal standards of notice pleading. "The general policy behind the
current rules of civil procedure is to provide every litigant with his or her day in court. The rules
arc to be construed to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding. The purpose of a complaint is to inform the defendant of the material facts upon
which the plaintiff bases his action." Carillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 274 P .3d
1256, 1267 (2012).
More importantly, Ballard fails to present any applicable legal authority to support his
position that the magistrate court erred. He relies upon Cronan v. District Court of Kootenai

County, 15 Idaho 184, 96 P. 768 (1908) and Huggins v. Green Top Dairy Farms, 75 Idaho 436,
273 P.2d 399 (1954). Neither of these cases are applicable to this case and provide no basis to
cs tab lish error.
The statute relied upon by the magistrate for the appointment of the receiver is Idaho
Code Section 8-601. 151 The Cronan decision does address Idaho Code Section 8-601, but rather
address a prior version of that statute, which at that time was Revised Statute 4392, subsection 5
that provided, "A receiver may be appointed by the court in which an action is pending or has
passed to judgment, or by the judge thereof; .... 5. In the case when a corporation has been
dissolved, or is insolvent, or in imminent danger of insolvency, or has forfeited its corporate
rights." Cronan, 15 Idaho at 206, 96 P. at 774. This section is currently codified at Idaho Code
Section 8-601 (5). The Cronan case is entirely distinguishable from the case at hand.
First, that case resulted in an entry of a judgment on default. The Plaintiff had filed a
complaint and prayed for relief in the form of a money judgment against a corporation and
requested the appointment of the receiver. The district court entered a judgment appointing a
151

R., p. 307.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF P -47SWW/rnew 16328-009/1892301

1/28/20 2:06:53 PM

receiver. The complaint had set forth no facts to establish that there was imminent danger of
insolvency. In this case, the appointment of a receiver was not entered on a default judgment,
but rather the appointment of a receiver was only entered after.four days of trial. In Cronan, the
court was limited to only grant relief that was properly pled in the complaint because it was
entered on default.
Second, the case at hand does not involve the insolvency of a corporation, but rather
involves Idaho Code Sections 8-604(3) and (4).

The district court affirmed the magistrate

court's authority to appoint a receiver. The magistrate court had found, "Charlie is a creditor to
whom funds arc owed. The appointment of a receiver is necessary to effectuate the 2007 and the
2008 Order. A sale of the remaining 48 acres is long overdue." 152
Third, Charlie did specifically plead for the appointment of a receiver in the Second
Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 she requested, "In the alternative,
Charlie requests that a mutually agreeable receiver be appointed to handle the approximately
forty-eight unsold acres that remain and that the net proceeds be divided equally." 153

The

Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 also specifically incorporated
by reference, "all of the pleadings on file with the Court." 154 When Charlie initiated the action
on September 16, 2013, along with the original Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809,
she also submitted a detailed brief and an affidavit in support of the petition that detailed all of
Ballarcr s conduct that was ultimately presented as evidence at trial. 155

152

R., p. 307.

153

R., p. 281.
R., p. 281.
R., p. 44.
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The Huggins case is likewise inapplicable. In Huggins, the district court had appointed a
receiver on an ex parte basis under Idaho Code Section 8-603. The plaintiffs in Huggins filed a
complaint and an affidavit stating the reasons why a receiver should be appointed. On ex parte
application on the same day, and without notice to the defendant, the court appointed a receiver.
The Court found that the district court had abused its discretion and "before the court should
have entertained the application, under the circumstances presented, defendant should have had
an opportunity to be heard and defend itself." Huggins, 75 Idaho at 445, 273 P. at 404. In this
case, not only was Charlie's initial petition accompanied by a detailed affidavit and legal
memorand um detailing the factual allegations, but moreover, the magistrate court had actually
denied an interim request by Charlie for the appointment of a receiver and opted to wait until it
heard all of the evidence at trial. 156 The magistrate court heard four days of testimony and
determined that the appointmen t of a receiver was appropriate.

The district court properly

affirmed the appointmen t and reiterated that "The power to appoint a receiver is very largely in
the discretion of the trial court." 157 Ballard has entirely failed to show any abuse of discretion.
The magistrate court had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver.
2. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's Decision to
Appoint a Receiver.

Ballard's argument on this point is not entirely clear. He asserts that the district court
erred ··when it affirmed the magistrate court's decision to appoint a receiver on the grounds that
every court has the authority to enforce obedience of its orders." 158 There is no question that
whether or not a receiver is appointed is discretionary with the court. Wechsler v. Wechsler, 162

156
157
158

R., p. 519.
R., p. 416.
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Idaho 900,915,407 P.3d 214,229 (2017). Ballard does not even address the abuse of discretion
standard nor any of its underlying elements. It is not even mentioned. Rather, Ballard states-surprisingly-that , "Charlie failed to plead and establish that there had been any change in
circumstances that made it unequitable [sic] to enforce the 2008 Order." 159 This statement is
false, frivolous, and belied by the entirety of the record in this case. There is no question that the
property, since the entry of the Final Order, has never been sold nor the proceeds allocated
between the parties. Additionally, over the course of the last eleven years, both parties at one
point or another have been put in charge of spearheading a sale and a sale has not occurred.
Also, during the course of the last eleven years, Ballard has engaged in egregious misconduct
including: transferring transfer title to various entities, reporting all lease income on his personal
returns, retaining all rental income, failing to pay the taxes from the rental income, and
partitioning off and selling 6 acres without Charlie's knowledge. Additionally, the magistrate
court found that all of his transactions with Steve Glezos did not appear to be normal in the
industry and "raised a number of concerning red flags as to whether Ballard has a side deal with
Steve Glezos and point to a non-arms-length contract." 160
Charlie filed this action under Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure Rule 809(5), which
provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order or proceeding where, "it is

no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." I.R.F.L.P. 809
(Emphasis added). Rule 809 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure embodies Rule 60(b)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore, the cases discussing Rule 60(b) are
applicable to the analysis under Rule 809.

159
160

Appellant's Brief, p. 25.
R., p. 302, ,r 51.
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In limited circumstances, a property division may be modified contrary to the bar of res
judicata under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Fix v. Fix, 125 Idaho 372, 376, 870 P.2d
1331, 1335 (Ct. App. 1993). The Idaho Court of Appeals cited a 1987 Washington decision as
follows: "A motion under Rule 60(b) is ancillary to or a continuation of the original suit and so
long as the Court had jurisdiction originally, jurisdiction continues for purpose of Rule 60(b). "
Id. (citing In re Marriage of Parks, 48 Wash. App. 166, 737 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Wash. App.
1987)). In Fix the Court of Appeals held that all property affected by the division in the divorce
decree can be included in the amendment to the decree. Fix, at 378, 870 P.2d at 1337.
This Comi has held that under Rule 60(b )(5) the magistrate court has jurisdiction to
modify a property division entered several years earlier in a divorce action. Rudd v. Rudd, 105
Idaho 112, 666 P.2d 639 (1983).

From the Court's Rudd decision came the following

requirements for a Rule 60(b)(5) application, "To rely on Rule 60(b)(5), a movant must show
two things: (1) that the judgment is prospective in nature; and (2) that is no longer equitable to
enforce the judgment as written." Rudd, supra, at 118-19, 666 P.2d at 645-46. Further, the Rudd
court explained, "The breadth of 60(b)(5) is broad and encompasses any final judgment having
prospective application ... When it is inequitable that a judgment should continue to be a lien
on thejudgnwnt debtor's property, relieffrom the lien may be given. " Id. (emphasis added).
In Rudd, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the judgment in that case (requiring the sale
of the real property and the division of the proceeds after deducting costs) "did operate
prospectively in that it contemplated a sale of the parties' property at some time in the future."
Id. at 119, 666 P .2d at 646. This Court found that the facts were sufficient to demonstrate the
required showing of a sufficient change of circumstances rendering the enforcement of the
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original judgment inequitable. Rudd is on point with the facts of this instant motion. (1) All
three orders that have addressed the Salt Lake property have contemplated the future sale of this
asset, and (2) it is no longer equitable to enforce the 2008 Order as written because of Ballard's
egregious conduct and dissipation of the asset.

Contrary to Ballard's argument otherwise,

Charlie has presented an abundance of evidence that show that a change of circumstances has
occurred since the entry of the 2008 Order.
In the 1993 Fix decision, the Idaho Comi of Appeals held that Rule 60(b )(5) may be
applied to allow the modification of a divorce decree, relying upon the Supreme Court's 1983
Rudd decision.

Fix, supra. at 377, 870 P.2d at 1336. The Court also warned litigators and

Courts that while it may seem to say otherwise, their decision in Leatherman v. Leatherman, 122
Idaho 247, 833 P.2d 105 (1992) was in truncated form and can easily be applied too broadly, and
cannot be used to assert that Rule 60(b )(5) does not apply in divorce actions. Id.
Ballard also appears to argue that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court
because "Receivers are rarely appointed" and "there is very little caselaw [sic] in the state of
Idaho as receivers are rarely appointed." 161 In support of this assertion, Ballard relies upon Kelly
v. iS'teele, 9 Idaho 141 (1903), which states that appointments ofreceivers are rare and should not
be made until the moving party shows himself clearly entitled thereto. It should be noted that the
Kelly decision, wherein the Court described the appointment of receivers as "rare," was issued

115 years ago; it is quite possible that it was rare back in 1903.
Moreover, Kelly, actually supports Charlie's position because this case is a rare case.
The Salt Lake Property has been ordered to be sold since 2005 and it has not. Not surprisingly,
Ballard does not mention this Court's most recent decision addressing the appointment of a
161

Appellant's Brief, p. 26.
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receiver in post-divorce actions. In Wechsler v. Wechsler, 162 Idaho 900, 407 P.3d 214 (2017)
this Court affirmed the appointment of a receiver in a divorce action and further recited that
"[t]he district court reasoned that Norman's motion was 'nothing more than attempt ... to avoid
his duties and waste the time and resources of the judicial system."' 407 P .3d at 220. Again, the
district court pointed out that this decision was made after the magistrate had the opportunity to
··observe the witnesses testify and examine all of the evidence." 162
In this case, not only has the Final Order already been modified previously, but the 2008
Order is clearly prospective in nature as it anticipates the sale of the Salt Lake property. Ballard
has concealed transaction, retained rental proceeds, failed to pay taxes and converted the
property awarded to Charlie, and should no longer be in charge of the sale of the Salt Lake
Property. The provision of the 2008 Order is prospective in nature and thus falls under the
purview of Rule 809. In summary, a receiver should be appointed in cases exactly like this one.
Ballard has failed to show how the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court.

D. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's Entry of a
Judgment Against Ballard for $112,125.
Similar to his argument to the district court below, Ballard still fails to cite to one rule,
statute. or case in support of his argument regarding the entry of the judgment. Charlie was
awarded one-half of the proceeds of the Omitted Portion of the Salt Lake Property which Ballard
surreptitiously sold and retained the net proceeds. Charlie is entitled to the judgment.

The

magistrate did not err. The district court did not err in affirming the magistrate.
It should be noted, for credibility purposes that on the very first day of trial, when Ballard

represented himself\ he testified that to the best of his recollection, he sold the approximately 6

ir,~

R., p. 416.
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acres of the Salt Lake Property for $40,000. 163 Of course, Charlie was ultimately able to obtain
the purchase and sale documents-not from Ballard-but through a subpoena to the title
company that showed that the property was in fact sold for $224,250. 164 Clearly, his testimony
on the first day of trial was not truthful.
Bal lard's argument appears to lie in the nature of an accounting dispute about taxes and
expenses on the property.

However, the Court has appointed the receiver to address these

expenses when it distributes the funds. This issue is not even ripe. The Order Re: Receiver
Duties entered on March 23, 2018, provides at Paragraph 4(A)(b) that the receiver shall
'"undertake an accounting relating to the Property ... to determine all income and reasonable
expenses accruing during that time period for purposes of doing a final accounting and
distribution to the parties of their legitimate equal share of the income less legitimate
expenses.'' 165
The district court cited to the magistrate court's findings that, "Ballard made this transfer,
retained 100% of the net proceeds." 166 Ballard fails to articulate any abuse of discretion or
articulate any actual error committed by the Court. He converted Charlie's property and was
caught. As for any accounting for property taxes, the remaining 48 acres have not been sold, but
when it is, there will be a final accounting of the expenses. The Court committed no error in
awarding Charlie a judgment in the amount of one-half of the equity in the six acres that Ballard
sold. The district court properly affirmed.

I(,,

ici1
165
166

Tr. p. 72, L. 3-25; p. 73, L. 1-25.
Trial Exhibits 209, 221.
R., pp. 585-86, ,, 4(A)(b ).
R., p. 420.
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E. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's Award of
Attorney Fees and Costs to Charlie.

The district court devoted a substantial portion of its Opinion on Appeal to the issue
regarding the magistrate court's award of attorney fees and costs to Charlie. The magistrate
court found, among other things that, "Ballard's current attempts to collaterally attack his own
stipulations and judicial admissions are frivolous, unreasonably, and without legal foundation.
The Court is left with the abiding belief this matter was defended frivolously, unreasonably and
without foundation." 167 The district court affirmed the magistrate's findings. "Findings of fact
that are supported by substantial and competent evidence are not clearly erroneous-even in the
face of conflicting evidence in the record." Woods v. Woods, 163 Idaho 904, 907, 422 P.3d
1110, 1113 (2018) (quoting Hull v. Giesler, 163 Idaho 247,250,409 P.3d 827,830 (2018)).
1. Charlie is the Prevailing Party.

It is well-established that, "[t]he determination of whether a litigant is the 'prevailing
pmiy' is committed to the discretion of the trial court." Gilbert v. City of Caldwell, 112 Idaho
386, 399, 732 P.2d 355, 368 (Ct. App. 1987). On the prevailing party issue, governing legal
standards are provided by Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 901 (B). Under this Rule there
are three principal factors the trial court must consider when determining which party, if any,
prevailed: (1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether
there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the
parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues. Chadderdon v. King, l 04 Idaho 406, 411-12,
659 P.2d 160, 165-66 (Ct. App. 1983) (referencing the corollary Rule of Civil Procedure,
l.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B)).

1 7
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Charlie filed the request to modify the court orders under I.R.F.L.P. 809 and ultimately
requested that a receiver be appointed, and Ballard pay her for one-half of the approximately six
acres he surreptitiously sold. The magistrate court appointed a receiver, entered a judgment, and
awarded Charlie attorney fees and costs.
Ballard asserts that Charlie could not be the prevailing party because she "dropped her
biggest claim" 168 which is not true.

The only "claim" brought by Charlie was a request to

modify the prior orders under Rule 809 and for the court to either order a buyout or a receiver.
These alternative requests were relief sought, not claims. Moreover, it made no bearing on any of
Ballard's arguments, because he maintained the same position and argument at trial - which was
an alleged lack of jurisdiction for the court to do anything. Finally, and most importantly, when
analyzing this case under the three criteria contained in Chadderdon all of the criteria are met.
The final judgment or result obtained was in relation to the relief sought. Charlie sought to
modify the orders and requested in her pleadings either a buyout or a receiver.

The court

appointed a receiver. There was only ever one claim brought by Charlie that sought a buyout or
a receiver and a receiver was appointed. As the district court found, "[T]he respondent opted to
utilize her alternative method of achieving her primary goal, which was the sale of the property
and

obtaining

one-half

of

the

sales

proceeds. 169

Ballard

actually

filed

two

counterclaims/motions, however, he never presented any evidence or arguments on those claims
at trial. Charlie completely prevailed on her claims because she also sought a judgment on the
approximately 6 acres that was sold, and she also was awarded that judgment.

168
169

R., p. 426.
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2. The District Court Properly Held that the Magistrate Court did not act Outside the
Bounds of its Discretion.

Ballard asserts that the district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate court's award
of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121.

The magistrate court found that

"[Ballard's] course of conduct has been a clear violation of the 2007 Order and the 2008 Order."
Ballard says this finding is clear error and again relies upon his "jurisdictional" arguments. The
district court properly rejected his argument and held that, "[t]he magistrate also did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the appellant's conduct was in violation of the court orders, which
culminated in the respondent seeking her petitions to modify." 17

°

Further, the district court

explained, " ... had [Ballard] complied with the terms of the court's orders, the disposition of the
property would not have taken more than ten years to accomplish and his opposition to the sale
of the property, which includes his assertions of arguments that are without foundation." 171
The findings by the magistrate are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Ballard's own violations were presented as grounds for a change to the 2008 Order because he
clearly should not have been in charge of the sale of the property.
More importantly, for the purposes of the legal argument, Ballard argues that the
magistrate could only consider whether Ballard's entire defense of Charlie's Second Amended
Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 filed on January 25, 2017, and that the magistrate
court should not have considered Ballard's "course of conduct" in deciding on fees. In fact, the
trial court is required to consider the entire course of the litigation in assessing an award of
attorney fees under Section 12-121. The case law provides that the "entire course of the ligation
must be taken into account." Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho
170
171

R., p. 429.
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87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). Ballard claims that he presented a legitimate, triable issue of
fact and that is sufficient to avoid fees under Section 12-121. He is incorrect. He relies upon

Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Idaho 185, 125 P.3d 1061 (2005). However, in a decision issued
nine years later, this Court articulated that even if a single, triable issue of fact exists, it will not
excuse ··a party from the aggregate of misconduct that necessitates or dominates the conduct of
the lawsuit" when the court is considering attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121."

Idaho Military Historical Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 632, 329 P .3d 1072, 1080
(2014).
The district court properly affirmed the magistrate court.

Ballard claims his

''jurisdictional" argument constituted a legitimate argument. The district court noted that Ballard
ignored entirely the fact that "the appellant repeatedly stipulated, admitted, and conceded that the
Salt Lake Property was community property. He undertook numerous actions that an owner of
the property would have taken and not someone who was bound by the interests of a corporation
or its shareholders. In fact, he took these actions after he had dissolved the corporation that
purportedly owned the property." 172 The district court did not err.
F. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's Award of
Costs to Charlie.
1. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's Award of
Discretionar y Costs.

Ballard alleges that the district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate court's award
of discretionary costs. Ballard then ignores the district court's decision entirely on the issue and
instead re-argues the magistrate court's factual findings.

The district court, in reviewing the

issue of the cost award, found that "the appellant has failed to apply the abuse of discretion
172

R., p. 429.
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standard factors to the magistrate's cost award in this case. This constitutes a waiver of his abuse
of discretion cost contentions." 173

Curiously, Ballard articulates no argument regarding this

holding by the district court. Instead, he ignores it entirely and simply readdresses the magistrate
court's finding below. Ballard waives his argument.
Despite the fatal defect of the waiver issue, the district court nonetheless addressed
Bal lard's underlying arguments. Ballard argued below to the district court that the magistrate
erred in awarding expert fees to Kerry Jorgenson, Jared Booth, and Larry Rigby, without
delineating whether these costs were awarded as a matter of right or as discretionary costs. 174
The district court rejected the argument, which Ballard presents again on this appeal, and found,
"The appellant essentially concedes that the magistrate could have awarded these 'expert' fees as
discretionary costs (and this includes the costs awarded for Jensen's fees)." 175 The district court
found that, "The appellant, therefore, has failed to show prejudice to a substantial right, where
these costs were available as discretionary costs and where the magistrate made express findings
as to the general character of the requested costs as reasonable and necessary." 176 Again, this
Court reviews the decision of the district court. Ballard ignores the decision of the district court
and does not even mention the district court's findings. Rather, he simply sets forth the same
argument he made before the magistrate court.
Moreover, Rule 901 (D) provides in relevant part that, "The trial court, in ruling upon
objections to such discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make express

173
17 1
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176
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findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should be or should not be allowed."
I.R.F.L.P. 901(D) (emphasis added).
Ballard did not object to Larry Rigby' s cost. While he mentioned his name offhandedly
111

his Motion to Disallow Costs, he did not object or articulate any basis for an objection to

Larry Rigby. The court is only required to address the discretionary costs that are objected to.
Additionally, with regard to Kerry Jorgenson and Jared Booth, Ballard's only argument
in his objection was a claim that no Rule was cited under I.R.F.L.P. 501.A. This claim was not
correct and was addressed by the district court. All three of memoranda cited to the applicable
rules.
2. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate Court's Consideration of
Three Separate Memoranda of Costs.
The district court properly found that under Rule 905 there is no prohibition under the
Rule on filing more than one memorandum of attorney fees and costs. In fact, in order to comply
with the Rule, the attorney submitting is required to attest to the basis and computation under
Rule 908(D).

Furthermore, Rule 908(D) does not limit how many attorneys may submit

affidavits but provides that an attorney claiming fees as costs must submit an affidavit.
Therefore, Ballard's contention that the Rules prohibit more than one memorandum of fees and
costs is contrary to the actual provisions in the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure.
The district court also found that Ballard failed to cite any legal authority in support of
his assertion that Todd Jenson could not submit a memorandum of fees because he is an out-ofstate attorney.

"This Court does not consider issues that are not accompanied by citation to

authority." 177 The Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs submitted by Todd Jenson sets

177

R., p. 431.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF P -60SWW/rncw 16328-009/189230I 1/28/202:06:53 PM

forth the basis for his fees.

Charlie was forced to subpoena numerous documents in Utah

because Ballard failed to disclose them. This is how Charlie obtained the communications with
iHeart Media and a number of emails between Ballard and Charlie Davis. The information was
invaluable for the trial and reasonable and necessary. Furthermore, the Idaho Rules of Family
Law Procedure do not require that an attorney appear in a case in order to file an affidavit of
attorney fees. There is no limitation provided in Idaho Code§ 12-121 or in Rule 908(D).
Finally, Ballard incorrectly argues that Charlie must verify, not the attorney, the fees
pursuant to Rule 905. Rule 905 addresses costs. Charlie did file a verified document regarding
costs. The attorney fees are addressed under Rule 908. Rule 908(D) is mandatory and states that
the "claim for attorney fees must be supported by an affidavit of the attorney stating the basis
and method of computation." It is impossible to see how Charlie could even make such an
attestation that the items are correct and "in compliance with the rule."
Ballard's position requires the strictest interpretation of Rule 905 and disregards the
entirety of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure. Rule 101 of the Idaho Rules of Family
Law Procedure provides that "[t]hese rules shall be liberally construed .... " Ballard's argument
disregards the policy behind the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure. See Bunn v. Bunn, 99
Idaho 710, 5 87 P .2d 1245 (1978) (discussing "spirit of liberality" inherent within the analogous
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure); Holmes v. Henderson Oil Co., 102 Idaho 214, 216, 628 P.2d
1048, 1050 ( 1981) ("the rules are to be liberally construed").
More importantly, Ballard's position is specifically rejected by the case law. Rule 905 of
the Idaho Rules of Family Law is substantially similar to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4) and for the purposes

or this

argument is identical in regard to the fact that it also refers to "party." This Court has

held that an affidavit from an attorney is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 54(d). See
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Great Plains Equipment, Inc., v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 979 P.2d 627 (1999).
There is no requirement that Charlie has to verify the attorney's submission of the attorney fees
under Rule 908. The district court found Ballard's argument to be without merit under Great
Plains Equipment, Inc. citing specifically, "K&O asserts that NWP failed to make a timely
request for attorney fees and failed to make the petition in the prope1iy form pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54. We conclude that the affidavit of Ronald E. Bush, setting forth NWP's costs and attorney
fees covers all of the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5)." 178 The district court property affirmed
the magistrate court's consideration of the three separate cost bills submitted by Charlie's
counsel.
G. The District Court Properly Awarded Charlie Attorney Fees and Costs on
Appeal.

Ballard's Notice of Appeal to this Court does not enumerate as an issue on appeal the
district court's award of attorney fees on appeal. Moreover, Ballard fails to assign any error to
the district court's award of attorney fees and costs.

Rather, he simply argues the factual

findings issued by the magistrate court that were affirmed by the district court on appeal. As the
district court found, "The majority of appellant's argument on appeal consisted of his effort to
assert the magistrate court had no 'jurisdiction' over the Salt Lake property, due to ownership
and community property issues, which had long ago been decided in the case and which were not
appealed from. This classifies as frivolous." 179 Additionally, the district court properly relied
upon In re Doe, 157 Idaho 14, 19, 333 P.3d 125, 130 (2014) in support of its finding that the
remainder of Ballard's arguments were simply an invitation to the district court to reweigh the
evidence.
178

170
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H. Ballard is Not Entitled to An Award of Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal.
There is no basis whatsoever for Ballard's claim that Charlie frivolously defended against
his appeal. Charlie was the prevailing party before the magistrate court and the district court on
appeal. There is no basis for an award of attorney fees to Ballard under Idaho Code Section 12121. Charlie filed the request to modify the court orders under I.R.F .L.P. 809 and ultimately
requested that a receiver be appointed, and Ballard pay her for one-half of the approximately six
acres he surreptitiously sold. The magistrate court appointed a receiver, entered a judgment, and
awarded Charlie attorney fees and costs. The district court properly affirmed. Charlie has not
frivolously defended against this appeal.

I. Charlie is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Incurred in
Defending Against Ballard's Appeal.
Charlie should be awarded her attorney fees and costs in having to respond to Ballard's
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 12-107; Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b)(4), 35(b)(5),
and 41; and Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 908.
Attorney fees and costs may be awarded on appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and
Idaho Appellate Rule 41, to the prevailing party where the appellate court is left with an abiding
belief that the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
Excel Leasing Co. v. Christensen, 115 Idaho 708, 712, 796 P.2d 585, 589 (Ct. App. 1989).
An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 "is appropriate if the appellant
simply invites the appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence."

Benninger v. Derffield, 145 Idaho 373, 377, 179 P.3d 336, 341 (2008).

Where issues of

discretion are involved, an award of attorney fees is proper if the appellant fails to make a cogent
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challenge to the judge's exercise of discretion. Andrews v. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc., 117 Idaho
195, 786 P.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1990).
Ballard makes no cogent legal argument justifying a reversal of the district court's
decision. Instead, he is inviting this Court to second-guess the district court. Charlie respectfully
requests that this Court award her the reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending
against Ballard's frivolous appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 12-107, Idaho Rule of
Family Law Procedure 908 and Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b )( 4), 35(b )(5), and 41.

V.

CONCLUSION

The record demonstrates that the district court properly affirmed the magistrate court and
the magistrate's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Ballard's appeal brief fails to
demonstrate reversible error by the district court. Therefore, Charlie respectfully requests this
Court to affirm the district court's Opinion on Appeal. Charlie also respectfully requests that this
Court award her attorney fees and costs as set forth above.
(1,,-DATED this ~ day of January, 2020

STANLEY W. WELSH
Attorneys for Petitioner/Respond ent
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Lf:_ day of January, 2020, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Derek Pica
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 302
Boise, ID 83702
Served by: Electronic Mail

STANLEY W. WELSH
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